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Abstract
Diverse measures are used as proxies for judicial ability, ranging from the college and
law school a judge attended to the rate at which her decisions are cited by other judges.
Yet there has been little serious examination of which of these ability measures is better
or worse at predicting the quality of judicial performance—including the management
and disposition of cases. In this article, we attempt to evaluate these measures of ability
by examining a rich group of performance indicators. Our innovation is to derive
performance measures from judicial decisions other than case outcomes (which are
inherently difficult to evaluate): the decisions to preside over a securities class action, to
reject a motion for lead plaintiff, to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, and to reject a
request for fees. In each case, an affirmative decision requires more work from the judge,
and thus may be an indicator that the judge works hard and, all else equal, performs well.
Using a database of securities class action cases, we find that judges who publish
frequently and are highly cited are more likely to dismiss with prejudice but no more
likely to make the hard choice in the other cases. Other proxies for judicial ability
(attended top law school, judicial experience, earlier position as judge, prior private
practice, heavy business caseload, and senior status) are more mixed.
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1.

Introduction
A large literature has established that judges are sometimes influenced by their

ideological preferences, but leaves unanswered many questions about judicial
decisionmaking. One unanswered question concerns the relationship between the ability
of judges and their output. Everyone would agree that judges with greater ability should
produce better output—more decisions, higher-quality decisions, better opinions that
describe their reasoning. But what are the best indicators of judicial ability? This
question has received little attention. Yet it is important. When district judges are
nominated to the appellate bench, for example, their performance as trial judges provides
a basis for evaluating them. Nevertheless, there is rarely a serious inquiry into what
objectively measureable aspects of the relative performances of the lower court judges or
their prior backgrounds should be considered in determining the best candidates for
promotion.
By contrast, the primary ratings of nominees that are employed in the context of
the judicial appointments, the subjective ratings produced by the American Bar
Association, have been found to have but a limited relationship to future judicial
performance, measured in terms of reversals and citations (Barondes 2009; Landes et al.
1998, at 325). These ratings have also been criticized by conservatives who believe that
they are politically biased (Vining et al. 2009, discuss the debate and the empirical
evidence). Similarly, take some of the most familiar indicators of quality that the press
discusses any time there is a judicial candidate who has been nominated for a higher
office; law school attended, prior judicial experience, prior practice experience. It is
plausible that each of these may be an indicator of future judicial performance, but there
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is also reason to be skeptical of the degree to which these measures will translate into
future judicial performance. Law school, for example, for most judicial candidates (who
are usually in their late 40s or early 50s) reflects experiences from at least two decades in
their past.
Broadly speaking, our hypothesis is that more able judges produce superior
judicial output. This hypothesis might seem too obvious to be worth proving, but in fact
raises important and interesting issues. The first is the methodological challenge of
finding measures for judicial ability—which judges are “better” than other judges? We
catalog three categories of judicial ability: past judicial performance; native or
experiential ability; and depreciating ability.
Past Performance: Recent academic work on judicial behavior, including ours,
has extensively used measures of past performance of judges as a measure of judicial
ability (e.g., Choi & Gulati 2004; Cross & Lindquist 2009). The most commonly used
measures of past judicial performance are positive citations to a judge’s opinions (which
purports to measure opinion quality), the judge’s rate of affirmances by a higher court
(which might measure either quality or an ability to anticipate the preferences of the
higher court), and productivity or propensity to exert effort (as measured by the number
of published opinions per district court filing).
Native Talent and Experience: A casual examination of press accounts of the
qualifications of lower court judges seeking elevation reveals that other measures – ones
that might be characterized as indicators of native talent and experience – are discussed
far more often. These are measures such as general judicial experience (number of years
on the job as a federal district judge and whether the district judge served as a judge in
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another court prior to elevation to the federal bench) and specialized judicial experience
(whether one has worked on business matters in private practice prior to becoming a
judge and prior judicial experience in the business law area, for example). Similarly,
those who attended the best law schools are generally assumed to have the most native
talent.
Depreciating Ability: Judicial ability may increase with age (because of
experience) or decline with age (because of cognitive impairment). Given that judges
will vary widely in terms of the impact of age on them, as a function of their individual
characteristics, one way to study the impact of aging is to examine the performance of
judges who choose to take senior status. The choice to take senior status, we assume, is
also an indication that the judge herself has determined that she is no longer able to take
on a full load of work.
Our three categories of judicial ability give us a total of nine measures of judicial
ability—past performance (citations, affirmances, and publications), prior experience
(prior experience as a judge before joining the federal bench, experience as a federal
district judge, prior private practice experience, the business caseload of the judge),
native talent (whether the judge attended a top law school), and depreciating ability
(senior status). In discussions of judges and their qualifications, these various measures
are often discussed. But no one knows whether these measures predict judicial
performance. In this article, we attempt to get some traction on that question.
Our basic hypothesis that high-ability judges produce superior judicial output is
central to the design of the judicial system. In theory, only the law and the facts of a
specific case should determine judicial outcomes. If judicial characteristics matter, one
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can ask how the judicial system should be structured to minimize the negative impact of
such characteristics. Our findings provide insight into the relative value of having
generalist judges deciding complex, subject-matter specific legal issues, particularly
relating to securities class actions. If, for example, judges with specific business-law
related ability produce better judicial output, then our findings support the argument that
the federal judiciary may benefit from having more specialist judges.
Our dataset consists of decisions of trial judges on motions in securities class
actions for cases initially filed between 2003 to mid-2007. The dataset of cases includes
not just case outcomes, the typical measure used to evaluate judicial performance, but
also judges’ decisions on various motions, including motions to dismiss, to approve
settlements, and to approve attorneys’ fees.
We focus on securities class actions for a number of reasons. They are typically
characterized by two-sided agency problems (Choi 2003). That is, the real parties whose
interests are at stake, the shareholders, frequently have little control over the litigation.
Instead, the agents on one side, the corporate executives whose actions are being
challenged, have an incentive to bury any problems and settle using the company’s funds.
The agents on the other side, the plaintiffs’ lawyers, have an incentive to focus on
obtaining the highest fees with as little effort as possible. The end result is that many of
these cases result in high payouts for the plaintiff’s lawyers, low penalties for the
misbehaving executives, and high costs to the shareholders (Romano 1991; Bai, Cox &
Thomas 2010; Choi 2003, surveys the literature).
For our purposes, what is important here is that there is a central role for the judge
in protecting the interests of the class of investors (Miller 2003). The judge, who has to
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approve of any settlement that the executives and the plaintiffs’ lawyers make, has the
power to reject the settlement and demand that greater attention be paid to the interests of
investors. However, the incentives of the judge are not necessarily to act in such a
fashion. Demanding that the parties redo the settlement will require effort from the
judge, since she will have to give reasons and later assess the revised settlements. There
is also the theoretical risk of a time-consuming trial (although the risk is small, the costs
of a trial in terms of a busy judge’s time and effort would be high). Given that typically
both plaintiffs and defendants will support the settlement, the judge who wishes to
minimize work has an incentive to approve quickly whatever settlement is suggested (as
well as any attorney fees for the plaintiffs’ attorneys). This setting is useful for our
inquiry because it allows us to look at the behavior of judges in approving these
settlements as well as other pre-trial motions and draw conclusions as to whether they
exerted effort to protect the interests of the absent parties or deferred to the interests of
the lawyers controlling the litigation.
We also examine securities class actions because the law on such actions, largely
a function of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) was still
relatively new and evolving during the period that we examine (cases decided from 2003
to mid-2007).1 That means that lawyers would not have as yet been able to collect
enough information about how individual judges would behave so as to be able to fully
adjust their litigation strategies to the likely behavior of the judges in these cases.

1

The Supreme Court, for example, has issued a number of opinions interpreting important aspects of the
PSRLA over the 2000s, including Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148 (2008);
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); and Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336 (2005).
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Overall, we have four measures of performance in securities cases, where we can
say that if a judge takes action X, it constitutes better performance than taking alternative
action Y. These measures of performance are: accepting or rejecting a securities case;
approving or rejecting the lead plaintiff’s selection of lead counsel; granting a motion to
dismiss with prejudice; and acceptance or rejection of attorneys’ fees requests. We
explain these measures in the next section. Our goal is to examine how our nine
measures of ability map onto the five measures of performance.
We survey related literature in Section 2 and set forth our hypotheses relating
effort and expertise to judicial quality in securities class actions in Section 3. Section 4
describes our dataset and variables. Section 5 reports our empirical tests. Section 6
concludes.

2.

Literature
The literature on the relationship between judicial ability and judicial output is

sparse. Landes, Lessig and Solimine (1998) find that federal appeals court judges from
elite schools and those with high honors produce more cited opinions (a proxy for
quality). Christensen and Szmer (2009) find that more experienced federal appellate
judges are slower at deciding cases (they attribute it to “burn-out”), and that graduates of
elite law schools decide cases more quickly.2 Bhattacharya & Smyth (2001), using data
on invocations (a type of citation where the judge is invoked by name), find that younger
and more conservative judges tend to be more influential. R. Posner (1985), using
citation and citation depreciation measures, suggests a life cycle model. His theory and

2

In a related paper, Christensen, Szmer and Wemlinger (2009) find that that diversity of race and gender on
appellate panels correlates with delay.
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data suggest that judges tend to improve as they age up to a certain point and then,
presumably as age catches up, decline in performance. Taha (2004) finds that judges
with higher ABA ratings and more experience publish more opinions. Choi, Gulati and
E. Posner (2010), find that federal district judges who attended one of the top three law
schools publish more opinions. In a study of the Japanese judiciary, Ramseyer (2010)
finds that judges who attended elite law schools and performed well on an exam decided
medical malpractice cases more quickly and in greater quantity. Together, these findings
suggest judges with greater talent and experience—albeit up to the point when old age
sets in—score better on measures of judicial performance. We also see that having
attended an elite educational institution is frequently used as a predictor of future
performance.
There is some related work on specialization. Multiple commentators have
argued that higher levels of specialization might be beneficial for judging in the more
technical areas such as intellectual property, tax, bankruptcy and antitrust (Dreyfuss
1989; Dreyfuss 1995; Stempel 1995; Baum 2009, surveys the literature). Using data on
reversal rates in tax cases, Worthy (1971), suggests that specialists (tax judges versus
regular district judges) do better. Nash and Pardo (2008) compare the rates of reversals
and citation rates in bankruptcy cases for district judges and bankruptcy appellate panels.
Again, the specialists do better. Scholars examining patent cases find that the Federal
Circuit reverses district court decisions at a relatively high rate, as compared to the other
appeals courts, suggesting that the generalist trial judges do not do well in tackling cases
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in this area (Moore 2001; Chu 2001; Wagner 2004).3 The one study examining the
relative performances of generalist judges as a function of expertise is Baye and Wright
(2009). Baye and Wright look at reversal rates in federal antitrust cases as a function of
whether the judges attended an economics training course for judges. Judges with the
training have higher affirmance rates in antitrust cases.4 A related debate concerns the
dominance of Delaware in the field of corporate law. Some scholars argue that the
dominance of Delaware in corporate law is a function of the high quality of judges on
that court, particularly in terms of the strong business law backgrounds that they bring to
the courts and the fact that they regularly see and decide important business law cases
(Romano 1985). Securities law, and particularly, securities class action law, is a
technical area of judging. We would expect based on the foregoing therefore, that prior
experience in dealing with complex business disputes or transactions, would translate into
better securities judging.
Using data from a series of experiments on judges, Guthrie, Rachlinski and
Wistrich (2006; 2009) ask whether specialist judges (bankruptcy and administrative law
judges) are more likely to use deliberative processing of information or intuitive
processing. The latter type of processing, while having some advantages, can result in
faulty reasoning overall. Overall, the authors did not find strong differences in the
information processing methods used (intuitive processing dominated).

3

Yu (2007) uses reversal rates to compare the performance of specialist and generalist trial courts on
economic matters in the period prior to the establishment of the Federal Circuit. He finds that the specialist
courts are reversed less.
4
Moore (2001), however, finds no difference in reversal rates between Federal Circuit judges with
technical backgrounds and those without.

9

To summarize, there is some evidence that innate ability and expertise influence
the quality of the judicial product. But the overall picture from the bits and pieces in the
various studies is murky.

3.

Hypotheses
We hypothesize that higher-ability judges will produce better judicial output. The

challenge lies in measuring ability, on the one hand, and output, on the other hand.

3.1 Measures of Judicial Ability
We look at nine measures of judicial ability. Our first three measures look to past
performance as a judge. These measures are Publications Per Filing (number of
published opinions in 2001 and 2002 divided by number of filings in the district court in
which the judge sits), Positive Citations (the average number of positive citations per
opinion, from courts outside the circuit, for the judge for opinions published in 2001 and
2002), and the Affirmance Rate (the number of affirmances of published opinions,
including non-overruled, non-appealed decisions, divided by the number of published
opinions). We assume that judges who publish more, produce opinions that receive
more positive citations, and have a higher affirmance rate are judges with higher ability.5
The data we use to assess prior performance come from cases decided in 2001-2002,
prior to the securities class action motions data that are used for the dependent variable
(2003-2007). They also reflect all cases decided, not just securities class actions.
We also look at what we call native talent and experience ability measures. We
tabulate general judicial experience, including the number of years on the bench (Judicial
5

The citations for these opinions were measured up to January 1, 2007.
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Experience) and whether the judge was a judge prior to joining the federal bench (Prior
Judge). General judicial experience may translate into better judicial decisionmaking in
securities motion decisions in a way not captured solely through an assessment of past
productivity and opinion quality. We tabulate business-law related experience, including
whether the judge was in private practice immediately before becoming a district judge
(Prior Private Practice) and the fraction of business-law related cases the judge decided
from 2001 to 2002 (Business Caseload). The specialized ability of a judge to handle
complex business-law related issues may be important for how well the judge performs in
motion decisions during a securities class action. Private practice typically involves
corporate law or litigation, often securities litigation; for that reason, we predict that
judges with such experience will have higher ability for securities cases. Similarly,
judges who already have a lot of business cases will have higher ability for securities
cases. We also look at whether the judge graduated from Harvard, Yale, or Stanford Law
School, one of the top three law schools (Top Law School), as our measure of native
talent.6
We lastly look at whether judicial ability depreciates with age. For our proxy for
how age may affect a specific judge, we focus on whether the judge chooses senior status
(Senior). A senior judge may prefer to work less, reflecting less ability or energy.
Our past performance, native talent and experience, and depreciating ability
categories give us in total nine measures of judicial ability: (1) Publications Per Filing;

6

We initially limit ourselves to using only the top three law schools because the rankings at the very top
have tended to be very stable over the years. Since almost all of the judges in our study graduated well
before there were any U.S. News rankings, we had to use a more recent ranking. Based on the stability of
the rankings at the top end, we assume that this stability extended further back in time, over the different
years when the judges in our study graduated.
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(2) Positive Citations; (3) Affirmance Rate; (4) Top Law School; (5) Judicial Experience,
(6) Prior Judge; (7) Prior Private Practice; (8) Business Caseload; and (9) Senior.

3.2. Measures of Judicial Output
We use five measures of judge performance that exploit our dataset of securities
class action motions.
Taking on a Securities Case. Securities class actions are frequently difficult,
involving multiple sophisticated parties, numerous lawyers, and difficult issues of
causation, materiality and scienter. Not only is the regulatory apparatus complicated, but
so are the underlying theories of market behavior. To add to the judge’s woes, there is
considerable confusion about the precise standards coming out of the most recent statute
dealing with these cases, the PSLRA. We predict that judges with high general ability or
high specialized ability will be able to handle these cases more easily, and thus will be
more likely to take on these cases in the first place.
A caveat here is that judges do not formally have the power to choose whether to
hear certain cases. In theory, cases get assigned to judges in a random fashion. The only
exception is for senior judges who, as one of the benefits of seniority, get greater control
over their dockets. In addition, when judges take senior status, they are able to discard
portions of their docket; the discarded cases are then assigned to the other active judges.7
This measure, therefore, has the most salience for our subset of senior judges.
However, it is possible that the measure might also be relevant for active judges
because judges have several informal instruments for controlling their docket. First,
7

E.g., Rule 17 of the Local Rules (noting that “ [w]hen an active judge becomes a senior judge, or later as
the judge chooses, the judge may keep as much of his or her existing docket as said judge desires and
furnish the assignment committee with a list of all cases which the judge desires to have transferred.”).
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judges have some discretion over whether to recuse themselves from cases for reasons of
perceived conflicts of interest. These recusals could be on the grounds of either
ownership of stock, past work for one of the parties or ties to someone who has an
interest in the company at issue.8 Second, most securities class actions are the product of
multiple cases with an overlap in parties, claims, and factual background. The process of
consolidating cases and choosing which judge to hear the consolidated case may allow
for some discretion over assignment. Third, some courts, by local rule or custom, permit
the chief judge to assign cases non-randomly.9 If a big securities class action case comes
in, the chief judge may assign the case to a judge with special expertise in these cases.10
Fourth, some courts may have procedures for funneling “related” cases to the same judge,
in the interest of efficiency. These procedures might allow the judges room to assign
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The rules on recusal are fairly vague (a “substantial interest” test), giving judges discretion in their
decisions regarding whether to recuse themselves (28 U.S.C. Sections 144 and 455 are the relevant statutes;
Ingram 2009, discusses the current debate). The question for our purposes though is what recusal signals
about the judge in question. We have seen from recent nominations to the Supreme Court that the recusal
decisions of nominees are scrutinized carefully by opponents of the nominee (at least three recent
nominees, Alito, Breyer and Thomas, have been accused of acting improperly with respect to failures to
recuse themselves). Promotion-seeking and risk-averse judges might, therefore, be more likely to recuse
themselves. In addition, judges might also use recusal to avoid tough cases or ones where they might be
criticized. Concern about such behavior, we suspect, resulted in a line of cases on the “duty to sit”. Laird
v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972). However, on the other side of the equation, there is the obligation to
avoid the appearance of impropriety.
9
The website answering basic questions regarding the federal courts, explains:
At times judges having special expertise can be assigned cases by type, such as complex criminal
cases, asbestos-related cases, or prisoner cases. The benefit of this system is that it takes advantage
of the expertise developed by judges in certain areas. Sometimes cases may be assigned based on
geographical considerations. For example, in a large geographical area it may be best to assign a
case to a judge located at the site where the case was filed.
See Answer to Question: How are judges assigned to cases (available at http://www.uscourts.gov/faq.html).
The chief judge, we assume, will likely send cases toward those judges with an expertise in the
area. In theory, it is possible that the chief judge might also use her administrative power strategically, to
shape the direction of legal developments (a famous example is Justice Burger’s assignment of the opinion
in Roe v. Wade to Justice Blackmun). Wahlbeck (2006). We suspect, however, that such dynamics do not
exist on the district courts since the power to the chief judge to assign cases is minimal there.
10
For a broader discussion of these informal mechanisms of specialization on the federal trial courts, see
Baum (2010, chapter 1). Specialization by subject area also appears to occur on the federal appeals courts.
Cheng (2009).
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certain types of cases to the specialists among them.11 Fifth, judges may have some
leeway in deciding which cases to remove from their dockets and transfer to judges
newly appointed to the court.12 The new judge will typically be assigned a set of cases
from the assignment sheets for the other judges. Even assuming that the assignment
procedure is random (e.g., every fourth case gets assigned to the freshman judge), the
other judges may, depending on local practice, have room to say that they would like to
hold on to particular cases.13 In sum, although judges are not supposed to have discretion
over which cases they hear, some discretion might exist nevertheless.14
Rejection of the Lead Plaintiffs’ Selection of Lead Counsel. In a securities class
action, a court-appointed lead plaintiff acts on behalf of the rest of the investor class
members. The PSLRA creates a presumption that the plaintiff with the greatest financial
stake in the litigation (typically the party with the greatest damages), among other
criteria, will be appointed lead plaintiff.15 Congress intended the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff
provision to put in place a motivated lead plaintiff to protect the interests of investor class
members against possible agency problems with the plaintiffs’ attorneys.
At the stage in a securities class action when the lead plaintiff is selected, judges
make two decisions. First, the judge decides on the motion for lead plaintiff. Second, the
judge decides on the lead plaintiffs’ motion for lead counsel (often co-lead counsel). We
11

For example, see the rules of the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, districts that see a high
volume of securities cases. Rules 1.5 & 1.6, Local Rules of the Southern and Eastern District of New York
(1997; With Amendments through 2009) (hereinafter “Local Rules”).
12
E.g., Rule 12 of the Local Rules (explaining the system of assigning cases to new judges by lot, but also
noting that “[n]o case shall be transferred without the consent of the transferor judge”).
13
This possibility was suggested to us by a former federal district judge.
14
For a period of time prior to that covered by our dataset, chief judges on the district court had the
authority to reassign complex cases to particular judges (this was the 1971 Bar Harbor Resolution). This
resolution, however, was rescinded in 1999 on the grounds that it allowed undue specialization and was
inconsistent with “judicial autonomy”. Cheng (2007) (citing Committee on Court Administration and Case
Management, Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, March 16, 1999, available http://jnet.ao.dcn/library/99-mar.html).
15
See Section 21D, Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
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do not focus on the first decision on the lead plaintiff itself because, in many cases, the
judge does not have a decision to make. Where there is only one movant for lead
plaintiff, the judge will select the sole movant. Even if multiple motions are made for
lead plaintiff, as Choi (2011) reports, movants will often voluntarily withdraw their
motions leaving just one movant (or combine together to form one grouped motion for
lead plaintiff). We focus instead on the second judicial decision to approve the lead
plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel—a decision a judge will have to make in all cases
after the selection of the lead plaintiffs.
In practice, plaintiffs’ attorneys come tied to a specific lead plaintiff movant at the
lead plaintiff selection stage. Once the court appoints a specific movant for the lead, in
theory the movant is allowed to select any plaintiffs’ attorney of their choice. However,
courts often appoint the plaintiffs’ attorney who initially filed the motion for lead plaintiff
as the lead counsel (Choi 2011). If multiple movants are appointed together as a group of
lead plaintiffs, courts will often appoint the individual attorneys for each movant as colead counsel without regard to the need for multiple attorney firms on the same case
(Choi 2011). In effect, judges often appear to rubber stamp the selection of lead counsel
by the lead plaintiff despite the specter of attorney agency cost problems. The reason for
this may be that it is easier for the judge to do what the lawyers in front of the judge ask
for (typically with no party opposing the lead plaintiff’s selection of lead counsel); going
out of the way to act as an advocate for the absent investor is likely to annoy the lawyers
and delay the resolution of the litigation.16
Accordingly, we predict that higher-ability judges will be more likely to reject the
16

The fact that some district judges got reversed on their refusal to approve the lead plaintiffs’ selection of
lead counsel may have added to the district judges’ general reluctance to second-guess the proposed lead
counsel motion. See, e.g., In re Mexico State Inv. Council, 250 Fed. Appx. 225 (2007).
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lead plaintiff’s selection of attorney.
Dismissal with Prejudice. Defendants move for dismissal of the case. Denials of
such motions cannot be appealed because they are not final orders, but grants of the
motion can be appealed. In addition, because the grant of the motion ends the case at an
early stage and under a rigorous set of conditions (the judge is ruling that, assuming all
the properly alleged facts to be true, the plaintiffs still lose), judges are generally
expected to explain their reasons.
The opinion for judges who grant a motion to dismiss takes on special
significance in a securities class action. Because the determination of the motion to
dismiss in a securities class action is arguably the most important decision in the
litigation (securities class actions almost never go to trial), the lawyers and higher courts
pay special attention to how the law is developing in this area. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, who
are often repeat players, have an incentive to appeal if they think the law is moving in a
direction adverse to them. Unsurprisingly then much of the securities law involving Rule
10b-5 has been generated through motion to dismiss decisions as well as appellate and
Supreme Court opinions reviewing the motion to dismiss decision.17 Finally, when cases
are not dismissed, the parties are likely to settle (as opposed to going to trial), which is
17

To assess the importance of the motion to dismiss and the opinion written by the district judge supporting
the motion to dismiss decision, we canvassed the U.S. Supreme Court cases that dealt with Rule 10b-5 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the most common cause of action in securities class actions. We
determined what underlying district court decision led (ultimately after the Circuit Court opinion) the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari and write an opinion that generated new law on Rule 10b-5 by the
Supreme Court. Of the eight opinions we found that were written after 2000, seven of them involved a
district court that granted a motion to dismiss. The other decision involved a denial by the district court of
class certification. The eight Supreme Court decisions dealing with Rule 10b-5 from 2005 to 2011 (with
the district court's decision) were: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 547 U.S. 71 (2006)
(dismissal); Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 554 U.S. 336 (2005) (dismissal); Tellabs v Makor Issues
& Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (dismissal); Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta,
Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (dismissal); Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 286 (2010)
(dismissal); Merck & Co., Inv. v. Reynolds, 130 S.Ct. 1784 (2010) (dismissal); Matrixx Initatives, Inc., v.
Siracusano, 131 S.Ct. 1309 (2011); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., __ U.S. __ (2011) (class
certification); Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, __ U.S. __ (2011) (dismissal).
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less work for the judge. For these reasons, granting a motion to dismiss entails more
work and greater risk for the trial judge. We therefore predict that higher-ability judges,
with a particular interest in affecting Rule 10b-5 doctrine, will grant more motions to
dismiss, all other things being equal (including in particular the strength of the case).
Rejection of Attorneys’ Fees. The greatest point of conflict between plaintiffs’
attorneys and the plaintiff class is the attorney fee award. With passive members of a
plaintiff class, plaintiffs’ attorneys may use their control to request a greater attorney fee.
The greater the award, the lower is the recovery available from the settlement fund.
Meanwhile, the managers representing the corporate defendant have an incentive to
collude with plaintiff’s lawyers in order to make the case go away. We therefore
conjecture that higher-ability judges will be more likely to reject the lead counsel’s
attorney fee motion.
Of all our measures, this one is the most vulnerable to endogeneity problems, in
that lawyers will likely have a sense, ahead of time, of the degree to which a particular
judge is more or less likely to accept unreasonable fee requests.

3.3 Summary
We predict that high-ability judges are likely to produce higher-quality output.
We test among several different possible measures of general ability, including past
performance measures primarily used in the academic literature to assess judges
(productivity and citations) as well as native talent and general judicial experience that
are more commonly discussed in press accounts. It is useful to divide these measures
into law application and case management. Judges who are skilled at law application,
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and more broadly the development of the law, write lots of published opinions, are
frequently cited, and possibly frequently affirmed (though not if their ambitions outstrip
their abilities). Judge who are skilled at case management have more practical
experience as lawyer and judge. One might predict that judges skilled at law application
will be more likely to grant motions to dismiss (because of their intellectual selfconfidence and interest in securities law), and judges skilled at case management more
likely to deny motions for lead plaintiff and for attorneys’ fees (because of their
experience in the day-to-day management of a trial). We also test the importance of
specialized ability, as measured by private practice experience and number of business
cases tackled in the past. High-quality output means willingness to take the more
difficult path in securities class actions—accepting a case, rejecting the lead plaintiff,
dismissing the case, and rejecting proposed attorneys’ fees. We also test the importance
of the possibility of depreciating ability through our examination of the relationship
between output and senior status.

4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics
4.1. Sample
To test our hypotheses, we use two samples: a securities class action case dataset
and a judge dataset. Our securities data consists of class actions involving a Rule 10b-5
cause of action filed from 2003 to mid-2007 used in Choi (2011) and Choi and Pritchard
(2012), which were obtained from the Stanford Securities Clearinghouse.18 We exclude
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Choi and Pritchard (2012) add to the dataset in Choi (2011) and cover class actions filed from January 1,
2003 to June 21, 2007 for use in their test of the Supreme Court Tellabs decision that was announced on
June 21, 2007.
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cases in which financial firms (SIC 6000 to 6999) are the primary defendant because of
the different regulatory regime that applies to them.
[Insert Table 1 About Here].
Table 1 shows that the lawsuit filings were distributed relatively equally across
our sample period except for 2006 where there is a decline in class action filings.
Relatively few of our class actions were filed in 2007 due to the ending point of the
dataset on June 21, 2007. Looking at the frequency of lawsuit by circuit, we find that
most class action filings are in the Second and Ninth Circuits with 18.7% and 26.1% of
the lawsuits. Almost half (49.9%) of the class actions resulted in settlement. A large
percentage (37.5%) resulted in dismissal with prejudice.
Our judge dataset consists of all federal district court judges active in either 2001
or 2002. We selected the judge dataset time period to allow us to collect information on
the judge’s judicial output prior to class action filings in our securities class action
dataset. As reported in Table 1, we had a total of 615 judges.19 Of these 615 judges
active in 2001 and 2002, only 201 (or 32.7%) were involved in a securities class action in
our dataset.

4.2. Variables
We use two sets of independent variables in our regression tests. The first set of
independent variables are past performance (Publications Per Filing, Positive Citations
and Affirmance Rate), native talent (Top School), general judicial experience (Judicial
Experience and Prior Judge), specialized business experience (Prior Private Practice and
19

Some judges were excluded because they were active for only portions of the period. Also excluded
were a handful of judges where there appeared to be errors in the data (for example, where Westlaw had
conflated the cases for two judges with the same last name).
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Business Caseload), and depreciating ability (Senior) measures of ability for district court
judges.20
Some of our judicial ability measures do not vary during our study time period,
such as Top School, Prior Judge, and Prior Private Practice. For measures of prior
judicial output and experience, including Publications Per Filing, Positive Citations, and
Business Caseload, we assess the measures for each district court judge for the 2001 to
2002 time period prior to our dataset of securities class action pre-trial motion outcomes
that ranges from 2003 to mid-2007. For variables that can change over our study period
from 2003 to mid-2007, including Senior and Judicial Experience, we define the variable
based on our specific test. For our tests of whether a judge presides at least once over a
securities class action decision and the total number of securities-related reversals in our
class action sample period, we define Senior2005 as equal to 1 if the judge is a senior
judge in 2005 or earlier and 0 otherwise. We choose 2005 as the mid-point in our class
action dataset that ranges from 2003 to mid-2007. We similarly define Judge
Experience2002 as the difference between 2002 and the year the judge was appointed to
the district court. For our tests of individual class action decisions, we define Senior as
equal to 1 if the judge is a senior judge in the year of the specific motion decision in
question (e.g., a decision to appoint lead counsel) and 0 otherwise. We also define Judge
Experience as the difference between the year of the specific decision in question and the
year the judge was appointed to the district court.
20

Three of our measures of primary judicial ability, Publications Per Filing, Affirmance Rate and Positive
Citations, are subject to an endogeneity problem. A judge who incurs effort in order to publish opinions,
write highly cited opinions, or write the kinds of opinions that won’t be reversed, may have less time to
tackle difficult motions in securities litigation. However, we assume that these variables are independent
for two reasons. The three independent variables come from an earlier time period (2001-2002), and refer
to the mass of cases that judges hear, not just the securities cases. Thus, they are more plausibly a measure
of overall judicial ability.
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Beyond our measures of judicial ability, we include two other judicial
characteristic variables as controls rather than measures of judicial ability. We define an
indicator variable for whether the judge was appointed by a Democratic President
(Democrat). We do not assume that Democrats are more or less competent than other
judges, but one might predict that Democrats would be more favorable to plaintiffs’
lawyers, who are traditional supporters of the Democratic party, and to lead plaintiffs,
who are likely to be ordinary people cast as victims of corporate greed. We also define
an indicator variable for whether the judge was a chief judge at any point during the 2003
to 2007 time period (Chief Judge2003-2007). For our tests of individual class action
decisions, instead of Chief Judge2002-2007 we use Chief Judge, defined as 1 if the judge
is the Chief Judge in the year of the specific motion decision in question and 0 otherwise.
The additional administrative burdens of a chief judge may reduce their likelihood of
presiding over a securities class action and decrease the willingness of the chief judge to
exert effort. Table 2 displays summary statistics.
[Insert Table 2 About Here].
The second set of independent variables focus on a number of securities class
action level characteristics (collectively referred to as “Case Controls”). From the
complaints, we collect information about the causes of action alleged and use indicator
variables for the cause of action.21 In addition to Rule 10b-5, Section 11 claims were
alleged in 11.5 percent of the cases (Section 11). Section 11 is available only for material
misstatements and certain omissions in the registration statement used in a public
offering, but it allows for a substantially greater chance of surviving the motion to
21

For each class action, we collected data from the last filed consolidated class complaint. When a
consolidated complaint was not available, we collected data from the last filed complaint on file with the
Stanford Securities Class Clearinghouse.
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dismiss because Section 11 does not require plaintiffs to plead fraudulent intent.
Moreover, loss causation and due diligence are affirmative defenses.
We collect information on key aspects of the litigation from the last amended
complaint available for each class action.22 The presence of the information in the
complaint indicates that the plaintiffs found the information useful in meeting the
pleading standards. We include in our Case Controls indicator variables for SEC and
other government investigations (Govt. Investigation) and accounting restatements
(Restatement) as described in the complaints, each a high profile adverse event and the
most common events triggering these suits. The presence of a government investigation
or a restatement indicates a higher likelihood of wrongdoing and thus a stronger case for
the plaintiffs. The overall strength of the case will also be bolstered if the firm has
terminated a top officer including the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer,
and Chief Financial Officer (Officer Term.) or its auditor (Auditor Term.) due to events
relating to the fraud in question as described in the complaints. We also include whether
the complaint alleges insider trading (Insider Trading Claim), another indicator of
whether the corporate managers were misbehaving.
Next, we use variables in our Case Controls relating to the firm-specific
characteristics of the defendant issuer. We use a measure of firm size, measured as
market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year preceding the beginning of the class
period (Market Capitalization). Larger firms may have greater resources to defend
against a class action. On the other hand, larger firms may also be better able to pay a
settlement, leading to more vigorous prosecution of the case by plaintiffs’ attorneys. We

22

As described in Choi (2011), the complaints and other securities docket related documents were collected
from the PACER online website.
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also include one industry control that may relate to case strength. Firms in the high
technology sector (High Tech) may have stock prices that are particularly vulnerable to
declines in sales or earnings.
Summary statistics on the dependent variables used in our empirical tests are also
reported in Table 2. Table 3 reports the correlation among our nine judicial quality
measures. As reported in Table 3, the nine judicial quality measures are not highly
correlated. Senior judges are positively correlated with Judge Experience (correlation
coefficient = 0.353). Publications Per Filing are positively correlated with Top School
(correlation coefficient = 0.146).
[Insert Table 3 About Here].
5. Empirical Tests
5.1. Judge Assignment to Securities Class Actions
To assess whether judges use the limited discretion available to them to specialize
in (or avoid) securities class actions, we focus on whether a district judge in our judge
dataset acted as a judge in at least one securities class action during our case dataset time
period (from 2003 to mid-2007). We use an indicator variable, Securities Judge, defined
as equal to 1 if the judge made a lead plaintiff decision in a securities class action during
our case dataset time period and 0 otherwise. We selected the lead plaintiff decision
because this decision is typically among the first decisions a judge will make in a
securities class action. If a judge decides to recuse herself, this decision will typically
occur prior to the lead plaintiff motion decision. Similarly, consolidation of multiple
cases occurs before the lead plaintiff decision; any judge who seeks to avoid continuing
with a case by not remaining the judge over a consolidated action will do so prior to the
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lead plaintiff decision. As noted earlier, our caveat with this measure is that judges are
not supposed to have discretion over whether they take on cases in particular subject
areas. The exception is the case of senior judges, who do have substantially more
discretion over their docket.
To control for various factors that may affect the assignment of a district court
judge to a securities class action, we estimate a multivariate logit model with Securities
Judge as the dependent variable estimated on judge-level data. For independent
variables, we include our measures for past judicial performance (Publications Per
Filings, Positive Citations, and Affirmance Rate).
Whether a judge is assigned to preside over a securities class action will turn on
the prevalence of securities class actions in the particular district court in which the judge
sits. To control for this possibility, we include indicator variables for those district courts
with 20 or more class actions in our dataset.23 Lastly, not all our judges active in 2001
and 2002 remained active throughout the 2003 to mid-2007 time period of our class
action dataset. Some judges resigned, were elevated to a higher court, or died. Judges
who were active for only part of the class action time period will be less likely to have
presided over a securities class action. We include a series of indicator variables (Active
Service Indicators) for those judges active—including senior judges presiding over
cases—for only four of the five years, three of the five years, and so on with judges
active throughout 2003 to 2007 as the base category.
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These include the Southern District of New York, the Central District of California, the District of
Massachusetts, the District of New Jersey, the Middle District of Florida, the Northern District of
California, the Northern District of Texas, the Southern District of California, and the Southern District of
Florida.
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Securities Judgei = α + ß1iPublications Per Filingi
+ ß2iPositive Citationsi + ß3iAffirmance Ratei
+ District Court Indicators
+ Active Service Indicators + εi
We present the results in Table 4 as Model 1. We do not find evidence that any of
our measures of past judicial performance, Positive Citations, Affirmance Rate, or
Publications Per Filing, is associated with a higher propensity to preside over a securities
class action.
We next move to the native talent and experience-based measures of ability. We
re-estimate Model 1 with the addition of our native talent measure (Top School), our
general judicial experience measures (Prior Judge and Judge Experience2002), and our
depreciating judicial ability measure (Senior2005). We also include our other judge
characteristic control variables (Chief Judge2002-2007 and Democrat). Model 2 of Table
4 reports the results. Consistent with the expectation that senior judges have the greatest
control over their dockets, we find evidence that senior or close-to-senior-status judges
are less willing to preside over securities class actions. The coefficient on Senior 2005 is
negative and significant at the 5% level.
Prior judicial experience also shows up as a significant explanatory variable. The
coefficient on Prior Judge is positive and significant at the 1% level and the coefficient
on Judge Experience2002 is positive and significant at the 10% level. Those judges with
prior judicial experience are more likely to preside over a securities class action.
However, this finding has to be taken with a grain of salt, given that judges may not have
much control over their dockets.
[Table 4 About Here]
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We next focus on whether judges with prior business law experience are more
likely to preside over securities class actions—in other words whether district court
judges informally specialize in taking class action cases. We re-estimate Model 2 with
the addition of our specific business experience measures (Prior Private Practice and
Business Caseload). Due to the high negative correlation between Prior Judge and Prior
Private Practice, leading to the possibility of multicollinearity, we exclude our general
judicial experience variables (Prior Judge and Judge Experience2002). We report the
results as Model 3 in Table 4. Neither Business Caseload nor Prior Private Practice is
significantly different from zero. We find no evidence that judges with business law
experience have a greater likelihood of presiding over a securities class action. As in
Model 2, the coefficient on Senior2005 is negative but now significant at the 10% level.
Judges who are senior or about to become senior judges are less likely to preside over
class actions.24
In sum, we find relatively little evidence of the importance of any of the ability
measures in determining whether a judge presides over securities class actions. Our
measures of judicial ability based on past judicial performance are not related to the
decision of a judge to preside over a securities class action. Judges with greater prior
business caseload are no more likely to preside over a securities class action than other
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As a robustness test, we combine Prior Judge, Judge Experience2002, Business Caseload, and Prior
Private Practice together with our other independent variables in the same model. Unreported, we obtain
similar qualitative results as in the models of Table 4 with one difference.
To gauge the intensity of judge participation with securities class actions, we replace the binary
Securities Judge dependent variable in the models of Table 4 with the number of class action suits from
2003 to mid-2007 over which a particular judge presided (measured as of the time of the lead plaintiff
decision). Unreported, we find similar qualitative results with the following differences. The coefficient
on Chief Judge2002-2007 is negative and now significant at the 5% level in Model 2. This supports the
view that Chief Judges, perhaps because of their increased administrative burden, are less likely to preside
over securities class actions. The coefficient on Senior2005 in Model 3, while still negative, is now
significant at only the 11.1% level.
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judges, although judges with greater general judicial experience are more likely to
preside over such actions.25 As noted, it is likely that what we are observing is that active
judges have relatively little discretion in deciding whether to take on a securities case.
By contrast, senior judges, who clearly to have more discretion to select cases, are less
likely to take on securities class actions, and, even when they do begin them, are more
likely to drop them.

5.2.

Approval of Lead Plaintiff Attorney Selection
We predict that higher-ability judges will be more likely to reject the lead

plaintiff’s selection of lead counsel than are lower-ability judges. To test this hypothesis,
we construct an indicator variable, Lead Plaintiff Attorney Rejected, defined as equal to 1
if the judge rejected the lead plaintiffs’ choice of lead counsel without modification and 0
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Our tests above compare judges who presided over securities class actions with judges who did not
preside over such class actions. As another test of what factors determine whether federal district court
judges choose to preside over securities class actions, we examine whether the first judge listed on the
docket for a federal securities class action is the same judge who eventually makes the lead plaintiff motion
decision. We predict that lower-ability judges are more likely to drop out of securities class actions. We
construct an indicator variable, Judge Continues, equal to 1 if the first judge listed in the docket of the
reference complaint listed in Stanford’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse database (the consolidated
complaint in the case of multiple filings) is the same judge that makes the lead plaintiff motion decision
and 0 if the two are the different. We estimate three multivariate logit models using Judge Continues as the
dependent variable on case level data using case level versions of the independent variables of the three
models of Table 4 as well as the same case controls as in Table 5. The models exclude cases where the
reference complaint case shifted to another court before the lead plaintiff motion decision. The models also
exclude cases where the first judge no longer was actively presiding over cases (due to death for example)
by the time of the lead plaintiff motion decision.
Unreported, we obtain similar results as the three models in Table 4. We find evidence that senior
judges are less willing to preside over securities class actions. The coefficient on Senior is negative and
significant at the 5% and 1% levels in Models 2 and 3 respectively. This is consistent with our hypothesis
that lower-ability judges– as we assume is correlated with senior status – are more likely to drop out as
judge of a securities class action. We find that the coefficient on Business Caseload is positive and
significant at the 10% level in Model 3. This supports the hypothesis that judges with a greater prior
business caseload are more likely to retain jurisdiction over a securities class action. Unlike the models of
Table 4, the coefficients on Prior Judge and Judge Experience are not significantly different from zero.
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otherwise.26 We estimate a multivariate logit model using Lead Plaintiff Attorney
Rejected as the dependent variable on case level data.
For our independent variables, we include our measures of judicial past
performance (Publications Per Filing, Positive Citations, and Affirmance Rate). We also
include the Case Control variables and Circuit fixed effects in the model. Errors are
clustered by district judge.
Lead Plaintiff Attorney Rejectedi = α + ß1iPublications Per Filingi
+ ß2iPositive Citationsi + ß3iAffirmance Ratei
+ Case Controls + Circuit Effects + εi
We present the results in Table 5 as Model 1. The coefficients on Publications
Per Filing, Positive Citations, and Affirmance Rate are all not significantly different from
zero. None of our conventional measures of judicial quality correlate with the decision
by a judge to reject the lead plaintiffs' selection of lead counsel.
We next examine the native talent measures, experience-related measures of
judicial and business ability, and depreciating ability measure. We re-estimate Model 1
with the addition of Top School, Prior Judge, Judge Experience, and Senior as well as our
other judge characteristic control variables (Chief Judge and Democrat). Senior, Judge
Experience, and Chief Judge are all measured as of the year of the lead plaintiff attorney
selection judicial decision. The results are in Table 5 (Model 2). As in Model 1, the
coefficients on Publications Per Filing, Positive Citations, and Affirmance Rate are
insignificant. Contrary to our hypothesis that taking senior status was a sign of
diminishing ability, senior judges appear more likely to reject the lead plaintiffs’ choice
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Note that this variable is different from the Securities Judge variable, which was 1 if the judge made any
type of decision regarding the plaintiff’s choice of lead counsel (both approval and rejection).
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of lead counsel. The coefficient on Senior is positive and significant at the 5% level.
Measured at the mean of all the independent variables, the presence of a Senior judge
correlates with a 30.5 percentage point increase in the probability that the lead plaintiff
motion for lead counsel will get rejected. Not all Senior judges are the same. Those
Senior judges who, despite their greater ability to avoid securities class actions, decide to
preside over such a class action may differ from other Senior judges. These presiding
Senior judges may have greater inclination and expertise to handle securities law related
matters, leading to the positive correlation between Senior judge status and a greater
willingness to reject the lead plaintiffs’ choice of attorney. Model 2 also reports that,
consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficient on Judge Experience is positive and
significant at the 10% level. Measured at the mean of all the independent variables, an
additional 10 years of judicial experience correlates with a 2.6 percentage point increase
in the probability that the lead plaintiff motion for lead counsel will get rejected. The
other variables (aside from the Democrat variable, which turns out not to be statistically
significant in Model 3) are not statistically significant.
[Table 5 About Here]
In Model 3 of Table 5 we include our business-specific measures for experience
(Business Caseload and Prior Private Practice) and remove our general judicial
experience variables (Prior Judge and Judge Experience). In Model 3, the coefficients on
Publications Per Filing, Positive Citations, and Affirmance Rate are again insignificant.
Judges that score well on conventional measures of judicial quality are not more likely to
reject the lead plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel without modification, consistent with
our hypothesis. The coefficient on Business Caseload is positive and significant at the
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10% level. Measured at the mean of all the independent variables, an additional 10
percentage points of business caseload correlates with a 1.6 percentage point increase in
the probability that the lead plaintiff motion for lead counsel will get rejected. Judges
with greater business expertise are also more likely to reject the lead plaintiffs’ selection
of lead counsel without modification. As in Model 2, the coefficient on Senior in Model
2 is positive and significant (now at the 1% level), suggesting a willingness to exert high
scrutiny on the part of the senior judges. Measured at the mean of all the independent
variables, the presence of a Senior judge correlates with a 38.4 percentage point increase
in the probability that the lead plaintiff motion for lead counsel will get rejected.
To check the robustness of the results in Table 5, we combined Prior Judge, Judge
Experience2002, Business Caseload, and Prior Private Practice together with our other
independent variables in the same model.27 We expanded the definition of Top School to
include not only Harvard, Yale, and Stanford but also Columbia, U. Chicago, U.
Michigan, and UC Berkeley.28 We also added independent variables on the type of lead
plaintiff to the models of Table 5.29 The robustness tests returned similar qualitative
27

Unreported, we obtain similar qualitative results as in the models of Table 5 with the following
differences. The coefficient on Prior Judge is positive and significant at the 10.1% level and the coefficient
on Judge Experience is positive and significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on Business Caseload is
positive and significant at the 5% level and the coefficient on Prior Private Practice is positive and
significant at the 10% level.
28
These seven law schools were the top 7 law schools in the 1987 U.S. News and World Report ranking
and termed "Top School7". As noted earlier, we began by using only the top three law schools, as
measured by U.S. News, because the rankings of the top three schools have tended to be highly stable (and
therefore probably translated back in time in the same fashion). In expanding the list of schools, we
followed the same criterion. The top seven is the next most stable category at the top end of the rankings
(below the top seven, there is a considerable amount of shifting in the rankings for schools, relative to that
for the very top schools). We re-estimated the models of Table 5 replacing Top School with Top School7.
Unreported, the coefficients on Top School7 were not significantly different from zero and we obtained the
same qualitative results as in Table 5 with the following differences. In Model 2, the coefficient on Judge
Experience is positive and significant at the 5% level; the coefficient on Democrat is positive and
significant at only the 10% level.
29
We added to the models of Table 5 variables for the fraction of the lead plaintiff group that consisted of a
public pension fund (Public Pension), labor union pension fund (Labor Union), and other institutional
investor (Other Institution) to control for the importance of the lead plaintiff identity in determining
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results as in Table 5.30
Endogeneity is a potential issue with our examination of the judicial decision
whether to accept the lead plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel. Prospective plaintiffs’
lawyers might anticipate a judge’s ability and adjust their actions at the stage in a class
action when the lead counsel firms are selected. Where the judge has lower ability,
prospective plaintiffs’ attorneys may put forth an application for lead counsel that is less
likely to benefit the class and more likely to benefit solely the plaintiffs’ attorneys. One
can imagine, for example, plaintiffs’ attorneys agreeing to divide up class actions,
directing lower quality attorneys to low quality judges (who will be more likely to accept
such attorneys) and leaving higher quality attorneys for the high quality judges.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys may also aggregate previously separate motions for lead plaintiffs
and join together as co-lead counsel to eliminate the risk of not getting selected as lead
counsel and to diversify the risk of not achieving a profitable settlement from the
litigation (Choi (2011)).
The possibility of endogeneity in the motion for lead counsel will bias against
finding a correlation between judges with high ability characteristics and a higher
likelihood of rejecting the lead counsel motion. If lawyers perfectly anticipate judges’
ability, then lead counsel motions should never be rejected. Our results—which
demonstrate a correlation between certain judge characteristics and the rejection of the
whether a judge approves the lead plaintiffs' selection of lead counsel. Judges may be more receptive to the
lead counsel choice of an institutional lead plaintiff compared with an individual lead plaintiff.
Unreported, none of the coefficients on Public Pension, Labor Union, and Other Institution in the three
models of Table 5 are significantly different from zero. We obtained similar qualitative results as in Table
5 with the following exceptions. The coefficient on Judge Experience in Model 2 is positive and now
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on Business Caseload in Model 3 is positive but now significant
at only the 11%, just beyond conventional significance levels.
30
We examine whether the judge quality variables we identify as significant in the models in Table 5 are
significant when interacted with Judge Democrat. Unreported, none of the interaction terms in the three
models of Table 5 are significant.
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lead counsel motion—are thus of even greater significance. We also are unsure of the
magnitude of the possible endogeneity. As noted at the outset, we shaped our inquiry to
cover a period of time when the law on securities class actions was in considerable flux,
which should have made predictions about what judges would do more difficult from the
perspective of plaintiffs’ attorneys. To assess the impact of endogeneity, we need a
proxy for the “quality” of the lead counsel motion. For our proxy, we use the number of
lead plaintiffs in the lead plaintiff group. A large number of lead plaintiffs—with a
correspondingly larger collective action problem among the lead plaintiffs—indicates a
greater likelihood that the plaintiffs’ attorneys have de facto control and that the judge
should pay greater attention to the motion for lead counsel. Plaintiffs’ attorneys, for
example, who know the judge will not in fact engage in close scrutiny of the lead counsel
motion will be more likely to combine with other plaintiffs’ attorneys (or alternatively,
find more lead plaintiffs on their own) to generate both a large group of proposed lead
plaintiffs and co-lead counsel.
We first compared the number of lead plaintiffs using a series of t-tests for our
judge characteristics independent variables—separating the lead plaintiff judges into two
groups based on the binary variables (such as Senior) and the continuous variables (such
as Publications Per Filing) divided at the median. Not one of our t-tests resulted in a
significant difference, suggesting that endogeneity is not a large concern for our lead
counsel selection test. We next re-estimated the models in Table 5 using an ordered logit
model with the number of lead plaintiffs as the dependent variable. Unreported, we
found that the coefficient on Senior was positive and significant at the 10% level,
indicating that plaintiffs’ attorneys may attempt to take advantage of senior judges by
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forming larger groups of lead plaintiffs (often with a correspondingly larger number of
co-lead counsel in the lead counsel application). As discussed above, senior judges,
nonetheless, are more likely to reject such applications compared with other judges. In
other words, it is as if plaintiffs' attorneys under-estimate the level of scrutiny and
attention senior judges are likely to apply. We also found that the coefficient on Prior
Private Practice is negative and significant at the 10% level, indicating that plaintiffs’
attorneys may worry about judges with Prior Private Practice and adjust to form smaller
groups of lead plaintiffs with a correspondingly smaller number of co-lead counsel in the
lead counsel application. The fact that Prior Private Practice was not significantly
different from zero in Table 5, therefore, could be a result of this adjustment on the part
of plaintiffs’ attorney to present such judges with less troublesome applications for lead
counsel firms.
In sum, our tests on the lead plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel provide limited
evidence that higher-ability judges are more willing to scrutinize lead counsel proposals.
In particular, judges with greater business law experience and general judicial experience
are more likely to dismiss lead counsel motions. While we do not find evidence that
judges with prior private practice experience are more likely to dismiss lead counsel
motions, we do find evidence that plaintiffs’ attorneys may adjust their behaviour to
present such judges less problematic applications for lead counsel. Senior judges,
contrary to expectation, do not appear to shirk on effort. It may be that senior judges of
low ability responsibly avoid securities cases (or those cases are not assigned to them),
leaving those cases to the subset of senior judges with high ability, who are willing to
retain those cases. It also may be that senior judges, while preferring to avoid securities
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class action cases, work hard on them once they have them (although we do find some
evidence that plaintiffs’ attorneys may present senior judges with more troublesome
applications for lead counsel).

5.3.

Dismissal Decision
We predict that higher-ability judges will be more likely to dismiss a securities

class action. To test this hypothesis, we construct an indicator variable, Dismissal,
defined as equal to 1 if the judge granted a dismissal with prejudice and 0 otherwise. We
control for various factors that may affect a judge’s decision to approve the lead
plaintiffs’ choice of lead counsel with a multivariate logit model using Dismissal as the
dependent variable estimated on case level data. We omit those cases where the
plaintiffs’ voluntarily dismissed their suit from the model.
As independent variables, we include our measures of judicial past performance
(Publications Per Filing, Positive Citations, and Affirmance Rate). We also include the
case controls described above to control for the strength of the securities class action.
Because the law of the specific circuit may affect the likelihood of dismissal, we include
circuit effects in the model. We include year effects (for the year of the dismissal
decision) to control for shifts in the law governing how courts deal with dismissals over
the time period of our class action dataset from 2003 to mid-2007. Errors are clustered
by district judge.
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Dismissali = α + ß1iPublications Per Filingi
+ ß2iPositive Citationsi + ß3iAffirmance Ratei
+ Case Controls + Circuit Effects
+ Year Effects + εi
We present the results in Table 6 as Model 1. The coefficient on Publications Per
Filing is positive and significant at the 10% level. More productive judges are more
likely to grant a motion to dismiss. Our other measure of past performance, Positive
Citations, is also significant at the 5% level. Judges that write higher quality opinions are
also more likely to grant a motion to dismiss.
[Table 6 About Here]
We next focus on our native talent measure, experience-related measures of
judicial and business ability, and depreciating ability measure. We re-estimate Model 1
with the addition of Top School, Prior Judge, Judge Experience, and Senior as well as our
other judge characteristic control variables (Chief Judge and Democrat) and report the
results in Model 2 of Table 6. In Model 3 of Table 6 we include our business-specific
measures for experience (Business Caseload and Prior Private Practice) and remove our
general judicial experience variables (Prior Judge and Judge Experience). In all three
models of Table 6, two of our past performance measures of judicial ability (Publications
Per Filing and Positive Citations) are significant. In Model 1, one standard deviation
increase in a judge's Publications Per Filing correlates with an increase of 8.2 percentage
points in the probability that the judge will grant the motion to dismiss. Similarly, in
Model 1, one standard deviation increase in a judge's Positive Citations correlates with an
increase of 9.6 percentage points in the probability that the judge will grant the motion to
dismiss. Higher ability judges are more likely to dismiss a case. In contrast with our past
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performance measures, none of our innate or experience-related measures of judicial and
business ability are significant in either Models 2 or 3.
To check the robustness of the results in Table 6, we combined Prior Judge, Judge
Experience2002, Business Caseload, and Prior Private Practice together with our other
independent variables in the same model.31 We also expanded the definition of Top
School to include not only Harvard, Yale, and Stanford but also Columbia, U. Chicago,
U. Michigan, and UC Berkeley.32 Both robustness tests returned similar qualitative
results as in Table 6.
The decision to grant or reject a motion to dismiss is the most important of the
decisions that we discuss. Unlike the other decisions, the decision on the motion to
dismiss will require a usually lengthy opinion applying securities law (rather than generic
procedural law), and an opinion granting that motion will be scrutinized by a court of
appeals. Thus, one might expect judges who are skilled in law application to deny such
motions more frequently than judges who are skilled in case management. Our results
provide some support for this theory.33
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Unreported, we obtained the same qualitative results as the models in Table 6. The coefficient on
Publications Per Filing remains positive and significant at the 10% level; the coefficient on Positive
Citations remains positive and significant at the 5% level.
32
These seven law schools were the top 7 law schools in the 1987 U.S. News and World Report ranking
and termed "Top School7". We re-estimated the models of Table 5 replacing Top School with Top
School7. Unreported, the coefficients on Top School7 were not significantly different from zero and we
obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 6.
33
Endogeneity is a potential issue with the dismissal decision because plaintiffs’ attorneys might rationally
anticipate a judge’s ability (and resulting inclination to focus on the motion to dismiss) and choose to
voluntarily dismiss their case prior to a judicial dismissal decision. Because we only test the decision to
dismiss on cases that were not voluntarily dismissed, we may understate the impact of a judge’s ability on
the overall rate at which cases are dismissed (whether voluntarily or due to a dismissal with prejudice). To
determine the importance of voluntary dismissal, we define Any_Dismissal as equal to 1 if the judge
granted a dismissal with prejudice or the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the suit and 0 otherwise. We reestimated the models in Table 6 using Any_Dismissal as the dependent variable. Unreported, we obtained
the same qualitative results as in Table 6. We thus find that higher-ability judges correlates with an
increased probability of dismissal—whether the judge makes the actual dismissal decision or the plaintiffs’
voluntarily choose to dismiss in anticipation of the judge’s likely dismissal decision.

36

5.4.

Approval of Settlements and Attorney Fees
The judge plays a key role in evaluating the two-sided agency problem in

securities cases at multiple points; one of which is when the parties bring the judge a
settlement agreement for approval. The role of the judge here is to act as the guardian for
the absent investors and ensure that their agents (the plaintiff’s lawyers and the corporate
executives) are not misbehaving. We take the willingness to reject settlement agreements
as a sign of judicial ability. Rejection means more work for the judge.
We first categorize judicial decisions on motions to accept the first preliminary
settlement motion. As reported in Table 7, only 8 out of the 247 cases (or 3.2%) with
judicial decisions on the first preliminary settlement motion resulted in a denial of the
motion. We then examined judicial decisions on the final settlement motion.
As noted earlier, this measure is particularly susceptible to endogeneity problems,
in that lawyers probably get familiar with the degree of scrutiny that a judge will apply to
their settlement requests. And, unlike with some of other measures we have used, where
the endogeneity problem was arguably ameliorated somewhat by the fact that the topics
at issue were new (relating to the PSLRA), a judge’s behavior vis-à-vis settlements
requests is likely consistent across a range of subject areas.
Consistent with the foregoing, we find no variation in the data. None of the
decisions we examined had a denial of the motion for settlement. Accordingly, rather
than look at judicial decisions concerning the settlement, we examine whether any
change takes place to the settlement amount from the date of the initial stipulated
settlement agreement to the date of the final settlement motion decision. Only 8 out of
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215 settlements (or 3.7%) had a change in the settlement amount from the initial
stipulated settlement agreement. Moreover, only 2 of the 215 settlements (or 0.9%)
resulted in an increase in the settlement amount to the benefit of class members.
[Table 7 About Here]
Because of the small number of denials of the preliminary or final settlement
motion as well as the small number of times the settlement amount actually increased to
the benefit of class members from the initial stipulated agreement, we are unable to
estimate a multivariate model to test our hypotheses on district judge characteristics.
Judges almost always—regardless of their characteristics—accept the settlement
proposed by the securities class action litigants.
In an attempt to get at the question from a different direction, we looked at the
decision by judges to approve the requested fees for the plaintiffs’ attorneys. The point
of greatest interest to one set of potentially misbehaving agents, the plaintiffs’ lawyers, is
the approval of attorney fees. Higher-ability judges will be more likely to scrutinize
these attorney fees because they cannot depend on the defense side to do so fully (after
all, they are paying the fees out of the corporate coffers rather than the pockets of the
executives). To test this, we focus on the sub-sample of class actions that resulted in a
settlement. We define an indicator variable Judge Rejected Fee as equal to 1 if the judge
rejected the attorney fee motion without modification and 0 otherwise. To control for
various factors that may affect the judicial decision on attorney fees, we estimate a
multivariate logit model on the set of settlements in our dataset with Judge Approved Fee
as the dependent variable. We note, however, that the attorney fee approval decision is
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also susceptible to the endogeneity problems similar as with the settlement request
decision.
For our independent variables, we include our measures of judicial past
performance (Publications Per Filing, Affirmance Rate, and Positive Citations). We also
include the requested attorney fee (Requested Fee). The chance that a judge will approve
the attorney fee in a securities settlement will decrease as the level of requested fee
increases. We also include the log of the settlement amount (ln(Settlement Amount)).
Judges may be more willing to accept the attorney fee request the greater is the settlement
amount. We include Circuit effects in the model to control for circuit-specific doctrine
and practices that may affect a judge’s propensity to accept the plaintiffs’ attorney fee
request. We have no reason to believe that the propensity of a judge to accept or reject
the fee request varied with time and do not include year effects. Errors are clustered by
district judge.
Judge Rejected Attorney Feei = α + ß1iPublications Per Filingi
+ ß2iPositive Citationsi + ß3iAffirmance Ratei
+ ß4iRequested Feei + ß5iln(Settlement Amount)i
+ Case Controls + Circuit Effects + εi
We present the results in Table 8 as Model 1. The coefficient on Publications Per
Filing is negative and significant at the 1% level. Measured at the mean of all the
independent variables, one standard deviation increase in a judge's Publications Per
Filing correlates with a decrease of 20.4 percentage points in the probability that the
judge will reject the plaintiffs' attorney fee request. Contrary to our hypothesis, past
productivity is correlated with lower willingness of a judge to reject an attorney fee
application after a settlement takes place. Our other past performance measures, Positive
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Citations and Affirmance Rate, are not significantly different from zero.
Next come our native talent measure, general judicial experience-related
measures, and depreciating ability measure. We re-estimate Model 1 with the addition of
Top School, Prior Judge, Judge Experience, and Senior as well as our other judge
characteristic control variables (Chief Judge and Democrat) and report the results in
Table 8 as Model 2. Note that in Model 2, the coefficients on Publications Per Filing,
Positive Citations, and Affirmance rate are all negative and significant (at the 10%, 1%,
and 5% levels respectively), contrary to our hypothesis that past performance will
correlate with superior judicial decisionmaking. Also contrary to our ability hypothesis,
the coefficients on Prior Judge and Judge Experience are both negative and significant at
the 1% and 5% levels respectively. Measured at the mean of all the independent
variables, Prior Judge correlates with a decrease of 27.1 percentage points in the
probability that the judge will reject the plaintiffs' attorney fee request. Similarly, a one
standard deviation increase in Judge Experience correlates with a decrease of 6.7
percentage points in the probability that the judge will reject the plaintiffs' attorney fee
request. Top School—attending, Harvard, Yale or Stanford for law school—is also
negative and significant the 1% level. Measured at the mean of all the independent
variables, Top School correlates with a decrease of 10.5 percentage points in the
probability that the judge will reject the plaintiffs' attorney fee request. Judges who
attended a top law school are less likely to reject the attorney fee request without
modification.
The coefficient on Democrat in Model 2 is negative and significant at the 1%
level. Measured at the mean of all the independent variables, Democrat correlates with a
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decrease of 70.9 percentage points in the probability that the judge will reject the
plaintiffs' attorney fee request. The drop in the probability of rejecting the attorney fee
request is large in magnitude for Democrat judges. Democrat judges in particular appear
reluctant to take actions that directly reduce the flow of money to plaintiffs' attorneys.
The Senior variable was dropped from Model 2 because Senior judges were
perfectly correlated with judges approving the attorney fee motion. On its face, this
finding might suggest that senior judges exert lower effort and thus are more likely to
accept the attorney fee request. However, litigants likely have greater familiarity with the
preferences of senior judges and may adjust their fee awards to match these preferences.
[Table 8 About Here]
In Model 3 of Table 8 we include our business-specific measures for experience
(Business Caseload and Prior Private Practice) and remove our general judicial
experience variables (Prior Judge and Judge Experience). Similar to Model 2, the
coefficients on Publications Per Filing, Positive Citations, and Affirmance Rate are again
negative and significant. As with Model 2, the coefficients on Top School and Democrat
are also negative and significant. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the
coefficients on Business Caseload and Prior Private Practice are positive and significant
at the 5% level in Model 3. Measured at the mean of all the independent variables, one
standard deviation increase in a Business Caseload correlates with an increase of 5.9
percentage points in the probability that the judge will reject the plaintiffs' attorney fee
request. Similarly, Prior Private Practice correlates with an increase of 22.7 percentage
points in the probability that the judge will reject the plaintiffs' attorney fee request.
Judges with greater experience with business cases as well as prior private practice
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experience are more likely to reject the attorney fee request.34
To check the robustness of the results in Table 8, we combined Prior Judge, Judge
Experience2002, Business Caseload, and Prior Private Practice together with our other
independent variables in the same model.35 We also expanded the definition of Top
School to include not only Harvard, Yale, and Stanford but also Columbia, U. Chicago,
U. Michigan, and UC Berkeley.36 Both robustness tests returned significantly weaker
results than in Table 8. We also control for possible selection bias from focusing solely
on settled cases and obtained similar qualitative results as in Table 8.37

34

To test the impact of the judicial quality variables for Democrat judges, we added interaction terms
between those judicial quality variables that were significant in Models 2 and 3 of Table 8 and the
Democrat indicator variable. Due to collinearity problems, we added interaction terms between Democrat
and Publications Per Filing, Positive Citations, and Affirmance Rate separately from interactions terms
between Democrat and Prior Judge and Judge Experience in Model 2. The interaction term between
Democrat and Top School was dropped also due to collinearity problems. Unreported, none of the
interaction terms were significantly different from zero. We similarly added interaction terms between
Democrat and those judicial quality variables that were significant in Model 3. None of these interaction
terms were significant.
35
Unreported, the results are somewhat different from those in Table 8. The coefficient on Publications
Per Filing is no longer significantly different from zero. The coefficients on Positive Citations and
Affirmance rate remain negative and significant (at the 10% and 5% levels respectively). The coefficients
on Prior Judge, Judge Experience, Business Caseload, and Prior Private Practice are no longer significantly
different from zero--possibly due to collinearity among these variables (and in particular the negative
correlation between Prior Judge and Prior Private Practice). The coefficient on Top School remains
negative and significant (now at the 5% level).
36
These seven law schools were the top 7 law schools in the 1987 U.S. News and World Report ranking
and termed "Top School7". We re-estimated the models of Table 8 replacing Top School with Top
School7. Unreported, the coefficients on Top School7 were not significantly different from zero. In
addition, the coefficients on Business Caseload and Prior Private Practice while positive are no longer
significantly different from zero. The other results are qualitatively the same as those in Table 8.
37
Observable data exists on the number of attorney hours only where settlement occurs. The decision to
settle, however, is not random. To control for this selection bias, we attempted to re-estimate the models
of Table 8 with the HECKPROB model in Stata. For an instrument, we used the total number of securities
class actions filed in the dataset time period for the district court in which the specific class action is filed.
We assume this variable is correlated with the decision to settle. A particular district court with large
numbers of securities class action may face greater pressure to dismiss such actions to clear their docket,
leading to fewer settlements. On the other hand, we assume this variable is not correlated directly with
requested attorney fees in a particular settled litigation. Unfortunately, the HECKPROB models did not
converge to a solution for any of the models of Table 8. To obtain convergence, in Model 1, we omitted
the circuit fixed effects and the case control variables except for the Officer Terminated, Insider Trading,
and log of market capitalization. The re-estimated Model 1 using HECKPROB returned qualitatively the
same results as in Table 8. To obtain convergence, in Model 2, we omitted Publications Per Filings,
Positive Citations, Affirmance Rate, the circuit fixed effects, and the case control variables except for the
Officer Terminated, Insider Trading, and log of market capitalization. The re-estimated Model 2 using
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In sum, the relationship between our measures of judicial ability and the decision
to reject attorney fees stand in contrast to our results for the lead plaintiff counsel and
motion to dismiss decisions. Unlike for the two earlier decisions, our past performance
measures of judicial ability are largely insignificant as explanatory variables. Our other,
non-business specific measures of ability are significant but in the wrong direction. We
suspect that the inconsistency of the results on this measure is largely a function of the
endogeneity problem. Lawyers develop familiarity with the individual propensities of the
different district judges and adjust their fee requests appropriately. The especially high
rate of success that lawyers have with requests submitted to senior judges and chief
judges (who are among the most senior of the active judges), is consistent with this
notion.

6.

Conclusion
The existing literature on judges focuses largely on cases where there are

published opinions. That poses a particular problem with regards to the district courts
because the primary task of these judges is to manage cases—ruling on evidentiary
matters, discovery requests, and preliminary motions—rather than publish opinions (Kim
et al. 2009). The recent electronic availability of information on decisions on the various
intermediate decisions in a case, however, has made a fuller and more fine-grained
inquiry into the behavior of district judges possible (Hoffman et al.2008; Kim et al.
HECKPROB returned the same qualitative result for Top School, Prior Judge, Judge Experience, and
Democrat as in Table 8. To obtain convergence, in Model 3, we omitted Publications Per Filings, Positive
Citations, Affirmance Rate, the circuit fixed effects, and the case control variables except for the Officer
Terminated, Insider Trading, and log of market capitalization. The re-estimated Model 2 using
HECKPROB returned the same qualitative result for Top School, Business Caseload, and Democrat as in
Table 8. The coefficient on Prior Private Practice is positive but significant at only the 15.8% level, beyond
conventional significance.
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2009). Using this data, we inquire into the behavior of district judges in securities class
actions, an area where the judge has a particularly important role to play in policing the
two-sided agency problem.
Below we set out a table that summarizes how our nine measures of judicial
ability translated into the four measures of judicial performance (with “Y” indicating that
the ability measure in question correlates with superior judicial performance and “N”
indicating inferior judicial performance).

High Publications
Per Filings
High Positive
Citations
High Affirmance
Rate
Attended Top
Law School
Judicial
Experience
Prior Judge
Prior Private
Practice
Business
Caseload
Senior Status

Decision to
Preside Over a
Securities Class
Action
0

Lead
Plaintiff
Attorney
Rejected
0

Dismissal
with
Prejudice

Judge Rejected
Fee

Y

N

0

0

Y

N

0

0

0

N

0

0

0

N

Y

Y

0

N

Y

0

0

N

0

0

0

Y

0

Y

0

Y

N

Y

0

*

*Dropped from the regression

One particular aspect of the summary table stands out. Certain categories of
ability measures do better in predicting high quality performance than others. Two of the
past performance measures (citations and publications) do well in predicting whether a
judge will grant a motion to dismiss. The other seven measures, by contrast, do not do
well at all on this score. This is perhaps because granting a motion to dismiss typically
requires the judge to provided a written explanation of his decision and subjects the judge
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to a meaningful risk of reversal. Those judges (law appliers) who have a greater ability
to write opinions and explain their reasons are perhaps more willing to take on the task of
granting a motion to dismiss. Also, given that the decision on the motion to dismiss tends
to be highly legalistic, it is probably those judges who have greater skill in dealing with
doctrine who do better at this task. The subset of judges who score higher on numbers of
citations and publications probably fit within this category.
It is interesting to note that it is a different subset of judges who do well on the
other measures, which arguably require more in the way of experience and judgment
rather than legal skills. These are the case managers. Take the two measures that involve
having to second-guess motives – that is, to recognize an agency problem. These two
measures are the ones that look at the judge’s willingness to question the selection of the
lead plaintiff in the class and to question the attorney fee request. Here, it is the judges
who have prior experience (in private practice, with business cases, and in judging) who
are more likely to perceive problems. Senior judges also appear to have a greater ability
to discern agency problems.
As for the ability indicator that is probably the first one that anyone notices when
considering a judge’s qualifications for a promotion – whether the judge attended a top
law school – it predicts nothing. Similarly, affirmance rates (or their converse, reversals),
tend to often receive attention when a judge’s performance is being evaluated. However,
we found little indication that judges with higher affirmance rates were performing better
on their decisions on key securities motions.
Finally, contrary to our predictions, we do not find consistently negative effects
for a judge taking senior status. Senior judges are less likely than active judges to preside
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over a securities class actions, but those who do preside are more willing to reject a lead
plaintiff motion.
The question of how to measure judicial performance is an age old one. Over the
years, numerous measures have been utilized by bar association evaluation committees,
researchers, politicians, legislatures, and so on. There has been little inquiry, however,
into which of these measures actually translates into better judicial performance. It has
been taken for granted, for example, that measures such as judicial experience, the type
of law school one attended, and one’s rate of reversal or affirmance, are important
indicators of judicial ability. We find that the question of whether the various ability
measures will translate into high quality performance on a particular task is a complex
one. On the tasks we examined, some of the standard measures did not perform at all.
Other measures performed better or worse on particular tasks. Finally, some actually
correlated with negative performance on a task. Different measures of ability, depending
on what aspect of ability they are measuring, work to predict different aspects of judicial
performance. Judges do a variety of different tasks that require varying sets of skills. At
bottom, our findings underscore the risk of using simple ability measures for the purpose
of evaluating judges along a unitary dimension of what makes a good judge.
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Table 1: Summary of Datasets
Securities Class Action Dataset
Year of Suit Filing

Freq.

Percent

2003

148

26.8

2004

172

31.2

2005

138

25.0

2006

81

14.7

2007

13

2.4

Total

552

100.0

Circuit Court
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
D.C.
Total

Freq.
36
103
46
21
50
26
27
26
144
20
50
3
552

Percent
6.5
18.7
8.3
3.8
9.1
4.7
4.9
4.7
26.1
3.6
9.1
0.5
100.0

Outcome (if Known)
Settlement
Trial Verdict or Judgment
on Pleadings for Plaintiff
Summary Judgment for Defendant
Voluntary Dismissal
Dismissal with Prejudice
Total

Freq.
254
2

Percent
49.9
0.4

6
56
191
509

1.2
11.0
37.5
100.0
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Judge Dataset
Involvement in Securities Class Action

Freq.

Percent

Involved in Securities Class Action

201

32.7

Not involved in Securities Class Action

414

67.3

Total

615

100.0

Freq.
28
69
51
51
70
62
49
42
89
35
57
12
615

Percent
4.6
11.2
8.3
8.3
11.4
10.1
8.0
6.8
14.5
5.7
9.3
2.0
100.0

Circuit Court
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
D.C.
Total

52

Table 2
Independent Variables
Judge Characteristics
Variable
Publications Per Filing

Mean
0.025

25th
Percentile
0.005

Median
0.012

75th
Percentile
0.026

Standard
Deviation
0.035

Positive Citations

1.735

0.710

1.333

2.116

1.925

Affirmance Rate

0.915

0.875

0.949

1.000

0.124

Top School

0.145

0

0

0

0.352

Judge Experience2002

10.694

5

10

15

6.782

Prior Judge

0.423

0

0

1

0.494

Business Caseload

0.093

0.000

0.056

0.135

0.135

Prior Private Practice

0.420

0

0

1

0.494

Democrat

0.524

0

1

1

0.500

Senior2005

0.224

0

0

0

0.418

ChiefJudge2003-2007

0.242

0

0

0

0.429

Variable
Section 11 Claim

Mean
0.115

25th
Percentile
0

Median
0

75th
Percentile
0

Standard
Deviation
0.3

Gov Investigation

0.429

0

0

1

0.5

Restatement

0.356

0

0

1

0.5

Officer Terminated

0.326

0

0

1

0.5

Auditor Terminated

0.074

0

0

0

0.3

Insider Trading Claim

0.588

0

1

1

0.5

Market Cap ($ millions)

5781.0

150.2

532.5

1972.8

20204.0

High Tech

0.167

0

0

0

0.373

Case Controls
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Table 2 Continued

Other Controls
Variable
Requested Fee
Settlement ($ millions)

Mean
0.269

25th
Percentile
0.250

Median
0.270

75th
Percentile
0.300

Standard
Deviation
0.052

23.1

2.8

6.0

13.5

89.1

25th
Percentile
0

Median
0

75th
Percentile
1

Standard
Deviation
0.469

Dependent Variables
Judge Level Dependent Variables
Variable
Securities Judge

Mean
0.327

Case Level Dependent Variables
Variable
Lead Plaintiff Atty Rejected

Mean
0.081

25th
Percentile
0

Median
0

75th
Percentile
0

Standard
Deviation
0.273

Dismissal

0.375

0

0

1

0.485

Judge Rejected Fee

0.215

0

0

0

0.412
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Table 3
Correlation of Judge Quality Measures
Publications Per
Filing

Positive
Citations

Affirmance Rate

Top
School

Senior
2005

Prior
Judge

Judge
Experience2002

Business
Caseload

Publications Per Filing

1.000

Positive Citations

-0.086

1.000

Affirmance Rate

0.064

0.020

1.000

Top School

0.146

0.028

0.006

1.000

Senior2005

-0.031

0.052

-0.060

-0.030

1.000

Prior Judge

0.030

0.006

0.014

-0.085

0.003

1.000

Judge Experience2002

-0.036

0.037

0.107

-0.022

0.353

-0.104

1.000

Business Caseload

-0.072

-0.024

-0.058

0.021

-0.005

-0.016

-0.095

1.000

Prior Private Practice

-0.043

0.022

0.054

0.073

0.065

-0.702

0.081

-0.074

Prior
Private
Practice

1.000

Table 4: Decision to Preside Over Securities Class Actions
Model 1
2.117
(0.68)

Model 2
1.639
(0.51)

Model 3
1.602
(0.50)

Positive Citations

0.010
(0.18)

0.015
(0.28)

0.015
(0.27)

Affirmance Rate

-1.184
(-1.34)

-1.625+
(-1.74)

-1.304
(-1.42)

Top School

0.405
(1.19)

0.366
(1.09)

Senior 2005

-0.871*
(-2.36)

-0.605+
(-1.73)

Prior Judge

0.639**
(2.80)

Judge Experience2002

0.045+
(1.77)

Publications Per Filing

Business Caseload

-0.708
(-0.81)

Prior Private Practice

-0.258
(-1.10)

Chief Judge2002-2007

-0.326
(-1.10)

-0.223
(-0.79)

Democrat

-0.176
(-0.63)

-0.329
(-1.33)

Constant

0.300
0.214
0.853
(0.37)
(0.24)
(0.97)
District Court Indicators
Yes
Yes
Yes
Active Service Indicators
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
404
404
404
pseudo R2
0.100
0.128
0.112
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Models 1 and 2 are logit models estimated on
judge-level data with Securities Judge as the dependent variable. District Court Indicators are for districts
with 20 or more class actions in our dataset and include the Southern District of New York, the Central
District of California, the District of Massachusetts, the District of New Jersey, the Middle District of
Florida, the Northern District of California, the Northern District of Texas, the Southern District of
California, and the Southern District of Florida. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.

Table 5: Lead Plaintiff Attorney Rejected
Model 1
9.094
(0.99)

Model 2
9.422
(1.02)

Model 2
13.595
(1.52)

Positive Citations

0.076
(0.55)

0.067
(0.49)

-0.006
(-0.03)

Affirmance Rate

-1.368
(-0.51)

-0.560
(-0.20)

-1.081
(-0.30)

Top School

-0.120
(-0.18)

-0.486
(-0.78)

Senior

2.777*
(2.52)

3.467**
(3.11)

Prior Judge

0.100
(0.19)

Judge Experience

0.080+
(1.92)

Publications Per Filing

Business Caseload

6.935+
(1.69)

Prior Private Practice

0.849
(1.45)

Chief Judge

0.517
(0.48)

1.445
(1.30)

Democrat

1.165*
(2.01)

0.628
(1.03)

-0.628
-5.697*
-2.606
(-0.24)
(-1.97)
(-0.67)
Case Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Circuit Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
234
234
234
pseudo R2
0.211
0.274
0.300
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Models 1 and 2 are logit models estimated on
securities class action case level data with Lead Plaintiff Attorney Rejected as the dependent variable
(rejection of lead plaintiff attorney choice). Errors are clustered by district judge. Note that Auditor
Terminated was perfectly correlated with Lead Plaintiff Attorney Choice and was dropped from the logit
model. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.
Constant
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Table 6: Dismissal Decision
Model 1
8.637+
(1.71)

Model 2
10.117+
(1.68)

Model 3
10.010+
(1.72)

Positive Citations

0.245*
(2.03)

0.281*
(2.14)

0.271*
(2.12)

Affirmance Rate

-1.492
(-0.91)

-1.426
(-0.85)

-1.270
(-0.74)

Top School

-0.314
(-0.68)

-0.345
(-0.75)

Senior

-0.570
(-0.80)

-0.438
(-0.62)

Prior Judge

-0.087
(-0.24)

Judge Experience

0.020
(0.71)

Publications Per Filing

Business Caseload

-0.923
(-0.61)

Prior Private Practice

0.253
(0.70)

Chief Judge

-0.239
(-0.40)

-0.216
(-0.35)

Democrat

0.959
(1.53)

0.835
(1.52)

Constant

2.286
-0.131
0.081
(1.30)
(-0.06)
(0.04)
Case Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Circuit Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
218
218
218
pseudo R2
0.179
0.198
0.200
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Models 1 and 2 are logit models estimated on
securities class action case level data with Dismissal as the dependent variable. Errors are clustered by
district judge. Note that Auditor Terminated was perfectly correlated with Lead Plaintiff Attorney Choice
and was dropped from the logit model. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.
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Table 7: Settlement Outcomes
Freq.

Percent

Judge Accepted Final Settlement Motion
Judge Rejected Final Settlement Motion
Total

241
0
241

100.0
0.0
100.0

Judge Accepted Preliminary Settlement Motion
Judge Rejected Preliminary Settlement Motion
Total

239
8
247

96.8
3.2
100.0

Settlement Amount Unchanged From Stipulation
Settlement Amount Changed From Stipulation
Settlement Amount Increased
Settlement Amount Decreased
Total

207
8
2
6
215

96.3
3.7
0.9
2.8
100.0
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Table 8: Judge Rejected Attorney Fee
Model 1
-33.172**
(-2.72)

Model 2
-57.260+
(-1.85)

Model 3
-33.793+
(-1.95)

Positive Citations

-0.399
(-1.41)

-1.557**
(-3.21)

-1.316**
(-2.87)

Affirmance Rate

-1.702
(-0.74)

-9.908*
(-2.22)

-6.768*
(-2.05)

Top School

-6.118**
(-3.40)

-5.338**
(-3.52)

Prior Judge

-5.504**
(-3.06)

Judge Experience

-0.421*
(-2.51)

Publications Per Filing

Business Caseload

8.441*
(2.30)

Prior Private Practice

2.603*
(2.50)

Chief Judge

-2.353
(-1.37)

-1.685
(-1.16)

Democrat

-7.092**
(-2.93)

-3.191**
(-2.94)

Log odds of the Requested Fee

4.023*
(2.44)

9.707*
(2.53)

6.113*
(2.57)

ln(Settlement Amount)

-0.473
(-1.21)

-1.626*
(-2.27)

-1.146
(-1.48)

3.781
26.877**
10.141**
(1.27)
(2.74)
(2.60)
Case Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Circuit Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
93
87
87
pseudo R2
0.254
0.568
0.480
z statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Models 1 and 2 are logit models estimated on
securities class action case level data with Judge Rejected Attorney Fee as the dependent variable. Case
Controls include the Restatement, Gov. Investigation, Officer Terminated, Auditor Terminated, Insider
Trading, Section 11, ln(Market Capitalization) and High Technology variables. Variable definitions are in
the Appendix. Errors are clustered by district judge.
Constant
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Appendix: Variable Definitions

Dependent Variables
Variable
Securities Judge

Description
Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge made a lead plaintiff
decision in a securities class action during our case dataset time period and 0
otherwise.

Lead Plaintiff Atty Rejected Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge rejected the lead plaintiffs’
choice of lead counsel without modification and 0 otherwise.
Dismissal

Indicator variable defined equal to 1 if the suit resulted in a dismissal with
prejudice and 0 otherwise.

Judge Rejected Fee

Indicator variable defined to equal to 1 if the judge rejected the attorney fee
motion and 0 otherwise.

Number of Securities
Reversals

Number of securities law related decision on which the judge was reversed
during the 2003 to 2007 time period.

Judge Characteristic Independent Variables
Variable
Publications Per Filing

Description
The average number of published opinions in 2001 and 2002 for the judge in
question as a fraction of the per judge number of filings for the district court
in which the judge sits.

Positive Citations

The average number of positive citations per opinion for the judge in question
during the 2001 to 2002 period.

Affirmance Rate

The number of affirmances of published opinions divided by the number of
published opinions. Affirmances include all non-overruled opinions including
non-appealed opinions.

Top School

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question graduated from
Harvard, Yale, or Stanford Law School and 0 otherwise.

Senior2005

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question is a senior
judge in the year 2005 or earlier.

Senior

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question is a senior
judge in the year in question (first suit filed year, lead plaintiff appointment
year, or outcome year depending on the test) is made and 0 otherwise.

Prior Judge

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question immediate
prior provision before appointment was as a magistrate judge or a judge in
another court system and 0 otherwise.

Judge Experience2003

Number of years between the year of appointment for the judge in question
and the year 2003.
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Judge Experience

Number of years between the year of appointment for the judge in question
and the year in question (first suit filed year, lead plaintiff appointment year,
or outcome year depending on the test) is made.

Business Caseload

The fraction of the judge in questions published opinions in 2001 and 2002
that were on a securities law or other federal business law subject matter.

Prior Private Practice

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question immediate
prior provision before appointment was in private practice and 0 otherwise.

Democrat

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question was appointed
by a Democrat President and 0 otherwise.

Chief Judge2003-2007

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question was the chief
judge for the district at any time during 2003 to 2007 and 0 otherwise.

Chief Judge

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question is the chief
judge for the district in the year in question (first suit filed year, lead plaintiff
appointment year, or outcome year depending on the test) is made and 0
otherwise.

Other Independent Variables
Case Control Variables
Description
Section 11
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint for a particular class action alleged a
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 violation and 0 otherwise.
Govt. Investigation

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated the presence of a SEC or
other governmental investigation or enforcement action relating to the fraud at
issue and 0 otherwise.

Restatement

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated that the company
announced a restatement covering at least part of the class period and 0 otherwise.

Officer Term.

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated that a top officer of the
defendant company resigned or was terminated during the class period and 0
otherwise.

Auditor Term.

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated that the auditor resigned or
was terminated during the class period and 0 otherwise.

Insider Trading

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint alleged insider trading and 0
otherwise.

Market Capitalization

Market value of a company’s common equity (in $ millions) at the end of the
fiscal year preceding the beginning of the class period.

Settlement Amount

The settlement amount for the class action.

High Tech

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is in SIC codes 3570-3577 or 7370-7379
and 0 otherwise

Public Pension

The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a specific case that consist of a public pension
fund.

Labor Union

The fraction of the lead plaintiffs that consist of a labor union.
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Other Institution

The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a specific case that are institutions but not public
pensions or labor unions.
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